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R6 CENT CASMS
course had absolute priority. The cases were both decided on their
facts, the court finding that the plaintiffs had in fact not made the
turns with reasonable safety, which is the statutory requirement.
The opinion rendered in the principal case was contrary to the
legislative intent and overruled established case law. It contributes
to a mechanical jurisprudence in an area of conduct singularly in
need of more fi6xible treatment. There is a compelling need for a
more ample explanation for the result reached than was provided in
this case.
Lowell T. Hughes
ToRTs-Ca uwABLE Im uNrr-Decedent died from injuries allegedly
received in a fall from a hospital bed while he was a patient in de-
fendant's hospital. His administratrix charged that the injuries re-
sulted from the negligence of the hospital and its agents. The de-
fendant answered that it operated a non-profit, non-stock corpora-
tion, for purely charitable purposes, and was not liable for negligence
under the doctrine of charitable immunity. Plaintiffs motion to strike
was overruled and the complaint dismissed. Held: Reversed. Despite
its previous contrary position, the court reasoned that charitable
immunity was based upon expediency rather than right, and, stand-
ing alone, it was not a sufficient defense. Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp.
As'n, 348 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1961).
The Mullikin decision placed Kentucky among a number of
jurisdictions which have recently denied charitable immunity.1 The
Kentucky court overruled a precedent which was established in 1894,
when a purely charitable institution was held immune from an ac-
tion for assault upon an inmate by an institution employee.2 Al-
though the Kentucky court continued to uphold charitable immunity
'Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 78 Idaho 60. 297 P.2d
1041 (1956); Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 105 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1960); Collopy
v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958); Bing v. Thunig,
2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957); Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St.
467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956)- Kojis v. Doctors Hosp., 12 Wis.2d 367, 107 N.W.2d
131 (1961). See Rodkey, Charitable Immunity-A Tale of a Law in Flux, 48 Ill.,
B.J. 644 (1960), listing twenty-one jurisdictions with no immunity and twenty
jurisdictions with quaed immunity in 1960, and the Hosp. L. Manual, Neg-
ligence II, charts A, A 1 & A 2 (Atty's vol. 1961), listing only seven states with
total immunity. A now out-dated survey is found in Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29,
143-200 (1952). Contra, Tomlinson v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 164 F. Supp.
352 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 160 Neb. 279, 70
N.W.2d 86 (1955); Memorial Hosp. Inc. v. Oakes, Admx, 200 Va. 878, 108
S.E.2d 388 (1959). See Joachim, Questionable Status of Charitable Immunity,
32 Conn. B.J. 830, 831 (1958) listing fifteen reasons given for the charitable
immunity doctrine.2 Williams v. Ind. School of Reform, 93 Ky. 251, 24 S.W. 1065 (1894).
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in decisions as late as 19543 and 1955,4 the doctrine was eroded in
1957 by Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese,5 in which the court held
that a charitable corporation had no immunity from tort liability
for violation of a statutory duty to provide fire escapes where a
stranger was injured on property held only for income production.
The dictum in the Roland opinion indicated that the doctrine would
soon be rejected. 6
Although the facts of the MulUikin decision are limited to a
charitable hospital, the language of the court is broad enough to
sustain unlimited rejection of the immunity as indicated by the fol-
lowing passage from the opinion:
The rule is that charity is no defense to tort. Immunity of charitable
institutions such as we have in this case is indeed an exception which
seems to have crept into our law under the pressure of expediency.
Upon applying the simple test of right and wrong we are forced
to the conclusion that the charitable nature of a wrongdoer should
create no exception to the rule of liability. Nor is there any reason
under the rule of right why the principle of respondeat superior
should not apply .... It has not been right, is not now right, nor
could it ever be right for the law to forgive any person or any as-
sociation of persons for wronging any other person.
7
[W]e think it unwise to distinguish between paying patients,
non-paying patients and other persons who may be negligently
injured. (Emphasis added.)8
Denial of the charitable immunity defense to a church in a subse-
quent decision 9 strengthens the broad language of the Mullikin de-
cision.
The Kentucky court had previously relied upon the questionable
theories of public policy, trust fund depletion, and implied waiver
in justifying the charitable immunity doctrine through the years.10
Because tort liability threatened the effectiveness and existence of
the typically small, donation-financed charity, which performed serv-
ices to needy and destitute, public policy warranted the protection
of charitable immunity. Under the trust fund theory, tort liability
was a diversion of funds given only for benevolent uses by the
3 Forrest v. Red Cross Hosp., 265 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1954).
4 St. Walburg Monastery of Benedictine Sisters v. Feltners Adm'r, 275
S.W.2d 784 (Ky. 1955).
5 301 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1957).
6See Oberst, Recent Developments in Torts; Decisions of the Court of Ap-
peals at the 1956-57 Terms, 46 Ky. L.J. 193, 196 (1957).
7Mulikin v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 348 S.W.2d 930, 931, 932 (Ky. 1961).
8 Id. at 935.
9 Sheppard v. Immanuel Baptist Church, S.W.2d (Ky. 1961).
10 Forrest v. Red Cross Hosp., 265 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1954); Williams' Admx.
v. Church Home for Females & Infirmary for Sick, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S.W.2d 753
(1928); Pikeville Methodist Hosp. v. Donahoo, 221 Ky. 538, 299 S.W. 159
1927); Emery v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S.W. 577 (1921); Cook
v. John N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, 180 Ky. 331, 202 S.W. 874 (1918).
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charity. The implied waiver theory presumed the beneficiary of the
charity impliedly waived a claim against the charity and assumed
the risk by accepting its services. All of these theories have been
criticized by legal writers, 1 but the Kentucky court continually re-
peated them until the Mullikin decision, although opinions in 195412
and 195713 indicated that a reappraisal would eventually be necessary.
In the Mullikin case, counsel for defendant presented two problems
on rehearing 14 which point up the considerations involved in judicial
rejection of charitable immunity: (1) whether the judiciary should
change the doctrine in the face of stare decisis and legislative in-
action;15 and (2) whether liability should be applied only prospec-
tively.
The doctrine of stare decisis' 6 has not had the restrictive force
upon change in tort law that it has had in areas of contracts and
vested property rights.ea Stability in tort law is, perhaps, less im-
portant than in property law, because tort doctrines which become
outmoded by social and economic evolution may be overruled with-
out impairing any vested interest. The changes that charitable in-
stitutions and society have undergone in this century reasonably war-
rant the present trend of charitable immunity reappraisal. The argu-
ment that the judiciary should not reverse a long standing doctrine
because of tacit legislative approval through its failure to change
the rule is deceptively plausible but potently unsound. The failure
of a legislature to legislate means a number of things. It may mean
that no strong force has contended for such action. Persons not yet
injured are unlikely to assume they will be, and legislative change
comes too late to benefit those who are already victims of the
immunity doctrine. Charitable institutions, on the other hand, have
a continuing, mutual interest in opposing change. An adoption by
the court of the legislation-by-inaction argument would tranfer the
entire burden of tort principles to the already overburdened legisla-
tures.
11 Brown, Stare Decisis is Worth Its Weight in Reason: Abolish the Char-
itable Immunity Doctrine, 46 A.B.A.J. 629 (1960); 9 Harper & James, Torts
§29.16 (1956); Prosser, Torts §109 (2d ed. 1955); Rodkey, supra, note 1.
1
2 Forrest v. Red Cross Hosp., 265 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1954).
13 Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese, 801 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1957).
4Petition for Rehearing of Appellee, pp. 11, 22-25.
'5 In Forrest v. Red Cross Hospital, 265 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Ky. 1954) the at-
titude of the court was expressed in the following passage:
It is our . .. view that if there is to be a change in the public policy
in this state on the subject, it should be made by the legislature and
not this court.
16See Brown, supra, note 11. But see Joachin, Charitable Immunity: Why
Abandon the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 45 A.B.A.J. 822 (1959).
16a Pound, Some Thoughts About Stare Decisis, 13 NACCA L.J. 19, 22
(1954).
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The argument that the court should deny immunity only pros-
pectively also has weaknesses. Kentucky ordinarily applies judicial
changes retrospectively as well as prospectively.1 7 Contract, statutory,
and vested rights are notable exceptions where solely prospective
application may be made in order to leave undisturbed such rights
made in reliance upon court interpretations. 18 Prospective operation
of judicial decisions, like legislative relief, would be of no benefit
to injured victims who could expect to benefit only from decisions
operating in their normal retroactive fashion. On the other hand,
the backward-reaching effects of a court decision compel the judge
to weigh carefully the need to depart from established precedent.
On rehearing, the Kentucky court refused counselrs plea to limit
liability to prospective application. Two cases involving charitable
hospitals were decided under the newly announced rule only a few
days following the Mullikin decisions.2 0 Hence the only limitation on
the retrospective application of the Mullikin rule is the one-year statute
of limitations,21 even though "the learned trial judge ruled in exact
conformity with the case law of this state... . ." (Emphasis added. )22
Legislative or judicial limitations of charitable immunity have
been adopted in a few states. The Rhode Island Legislature enacted
statutory immunity23 for charitable hospitals after a court rejection
of the immunity doctrine.2 4 New Jersey's legislature enacted a limit
of $10,000.0025 on beneficiary recovery after judicial rejection of the
charitable immunity doctrine.2 6 After rejection of charitable immunity
for a non-profit hospital,27 the Washington court refused to extend
liability to a non-profit religious organization. 28 Since 1956, charitable
17 Note, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1403 (1934), and for the relationship of this
practice to the declaratory theory of judicial determination see 41 Harv. L. Rev.
678 (1928).
18Bishop v. Bishop, 343 S.W.2d 587 (Ky. 1961); Hanks v. McDanell, 307
Ky. 243. 210 S.W.2d 784 (1948); Commonwealth v. Whitelaw, 302 Ky. 526,
195 S.W.2d 71 (1946); Button v. Drake, 302 Ky. 517, 195 S.W.2d 66 (1946);
Wilson v. Goodin, 291 Ky. 144, 163 S.W.2d 309 (1942); Payne v. Covington,
276 Ky. 380, 123 S.W.2d 1045 (1938).20 Gillum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 348 S.W.2d 924 (Ky. 1961); Hillard v.
Good Samaritan Hosp., 348 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1961).21 Ky. Rev. Stat. §413.140(1) (1958).
22 Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n., 348 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Ky. 1961).
23 Gen. Laws of R.I. Ann. tit. 7, ch. 1, §22 (1956).
24 Glavin v. Rhode Island Hosp.. 12 R.I. 411 (1879).
25 N.J. Rev. Stat. §2A: 53A-8 (1959).
26 Benton v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 27 N.J. 67, 141 A.2d 298 (1958);
Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29 141 A.2d 276 (1958); Dalton
v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22, 141 A.2d 273 (1958).2 7 Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wash.2d 162, 260
P.2d 765 (1953).
28 Lyon v. Tumwater Evangelical Free Church, 47 Wash.2d 202, 287 P.2d
128 (1955).
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